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A Man, Burning: Communicative Suffering and the Ethics of Images 
Marko Stamenkovic 
University of Ghent 
 
Introduction 
 
Have you ever seen a human being burning in front of your eyes? My own answer to this 
question would be negative. Let me reformulate the question: have you ever seen any image 
of someone burning? In this case, my own answer would be positive insofar as we take into 
account the relative accessibility of such images across the many and varied media worlds 
available nowadays. Speaking more precisely, the initial question has to undergo yet another 
reformulation: have you ever seen any image of a man or a woman suffering while setting 
themselves on fire? 
From a sociological viewpoint, suffering can be a source of power in at least two significant 
ways: by conveying information and by evoking emotions. Accordingly, social theories of 
protest as ‘communicative suffering’ distinguish dying with a cause from the one without a 
cause—unless the latter is related to some kind of ‘pathology’ (by which Biggs refers to 
suffering due to ‘personal grievances’).1 In light of this perspective, ‘suicide protest’2 
confronts normative (medico-juridical) viewpoints on self-destruction as the pathological 
form of suffering.
3
 Vision and visuality have an important role to play in this context. 
Although images of self-immolation as communicative suffering are known for exerting 
strong visual and emotional impact on viewers, normative discourses on self-inflicted death 
have rarely devoted due attention to exploring its image-based properties. This paper focuses 
on the gap thus provoked and aims at contributing to a greater comprehension of the issue.  
In trying to understand the emotional and political power of visual records of self-sacrificial 
death in contemporary society, I have selected one iconic example: Malcolm Browne’s 
photograph of a monk who burned himself to death in 1963 in Saigon (former South 
Vietnam)—he did so in protest against the local authoritarian regime supported by the 
United States of America. While having in mind some more recent cases as my points of 
reference for critical comparison (such as Mohammed Bouazizi’s example in late 2010 in 
Tunisia), I focus on the visibility of mortality in strategically-staged public dramas where 
                                                     
1
 Michael Biggs, ‘When Costs are Beneficial: Protest as Communicative Suffering’, in Sociology Working 
Papers, Paper 2003-04, (Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2003) 
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human suffering—through self-sacrifice by fire—becomes an important conveyor of social, 
political and ethical messages via emotional impulses. The main point of such an approach 
lies in the thanatopolitical potentiality of self-sacrifice (or ‘suicidal protest’) to challenge the 
political status quo in a given local context. This occurs via the mobilisation of people who, 
once the thanatopolitical message is transmitted and received, are supposed to engage in a 
common struggle against oppression, humiliation and injustice. The study contributes to the 
existent body of writing dealing with the subject at hand—nonetheless, further research in 
social philosophy, ethics, and visual culture at large needs to be fostered in order to highlight 
this relatively novel, though not always instrumentally effective, politico-emotional 
paradigm of our times. 
In this line of thought, the present study assumes that images of human suffering, regarding 
people who set themselves on fire in protest, can perform a political function in the contexts 
defined by what has come to be known as self-immolation, at least since the early 1960s.
4
 
The study is based on a personal database that contains two basic formats: the theoretical 
sources of contemporary scholarly expertise (Andriolo 2006; Benn 2007, 2012; Biggs 2003, 
2005, 2012a, 2013; Bradatan 2011; Canetto 2009; Crosby et al. 1977; Kelly 2011; Yang 
2011; Benslama 2011; Rivera 2012) and a number of photographic and moving images 
collected over the period of time between 2010 and 2013 from a variety of printed and 
digital media sources. Both types of database revolve around the subject of self-immolation. 
The most notable among them are linked to the following: the case of Mohammed Bouazizi 
and the anti-governmental uprising of Tunisian society in the aftermath of his death by the 
end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011; the wave of similarly induced deaths by burning 
across the regions of North Africa and the Middle East (2011-2012); a number of cases 
across Europe since the beginning of the so-called Eurozone economic crisis in 2008; and 
the ongoing proliferation of death among the Tibetans burning themselves in protest against 
the Chinese occupation and the oppressive conditions therein.  
This brief selection is, however, insufficient to encompass all the varied forms of self-
immolation that have characterised the last five decades of the world’s history. My study is 
based exclusively on a ‘type specimen of “self-immolation’”5 concerning “an act of public 
protest, where an individual intentionally kills him or herself—without harming anyone 
else—on behalf of a collective cause”.6 This definition is centred on several fronts of 
analysis. The first one concerns the performative aspect of the act. It bears a distinctively 
political tone for at least two reasons: it is a matter of acting in protest, against someone or 
something, most commonly a ruling local authority; and it is also a matter of public 
exposure: it brings the act to others, as openly and visibly as possible. The visibility is 
usually conceived in terms of an open-air space, whereas the act itself must occur near a 
strategically targeted location of political significance. It also includes awareness about 
recorded visual materials or a written public message on behalf of the one who immolates 
him- or herself. The second aspect of the definition is about an individual eager to kill him or 
                                                     
4
 Michael Biggs, ‘Dying without Killing: Protest by Self-Immolation, 1963-2002’, in Making Sense of Suicide 
Missions, ed. by Diego Gambetta (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
5
 ibid., p. 173. 
6
 ibid., p. 2. 
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herself without harming anyone else, which distinguishes the act from other forms of self-
immolation (such as ‘suicide attack’, for instance). The third one is centred on the results of 
the act: Biggs sees them as altruistic in the way that they do not aim towards achieving 
benefits for the sake of the individual involved in self-immolation but for the group, 
community or society to which the said individual belongs or identifies with. Accordingly, 
he introduces the notion of ‘communicative suffering’ that triggers the following question: 
can suffering really become a source of power?  
Communicative Suffering 
If suffering can be a source of power, as argued by Biggs, it can be so in at least two 
significant ways: by conveying information and by evoking emotions. Both ways became 
part of the global imaginary only fifty years ago (the early 1960s), and not before. This was 
due to the fact that, for the first time in history, the act of self-immolation was inscribed into 
the consciousness of the world by means of visual evidence. A photographic record played a 
crucial role in this cornerstone event that grounds my argument around the (visual) rhetoric 
of protest in thanatopolitical practices of self-sacrifice. This is most notable with respect to 
the relationship among the following three elements that are central for this part of the study: 
the public exposure of a dying body (whereas ‘dying’ does not imply the status of the victim 
as already and definitively dead, but rather as ‘living dead’—the in-between state closer to 
‘death’ than to ‘life’); its materialisation in images of dying through the visual evidence of 
suffering (before death itself occurs); and the exchange with the viewers where one’s 
suffering is mirrored in the emphatic, ‘receptive gaze’ of the others.7 By ‘the others’ I hereby 
refer to spectators, an observant community of onlookers, who must encounter their own 
guilty conscience in front of these images in order for self-immolation to fulfil its role as 
properly thanatopolitical. What they all have in common is not just that which constitutes 
emotional and political power, but also the ethical power exhorted in relation to the self-
sacrificial logic of thanatopolitics—or, as Stuart J. Murray says in another context, ‘the use 
of death for mobilizing political life’.8 
Biggs introduced the notion of ‘communicative suffering’ into scholarly literature on self-
inflicted suffering as protest by the mid-2000s.
9
 He uses it alongside some more familiar 
forms of political protest events, such as strikes and demonstrations and applies it to the so-
called ‘global repertoire of protest’. The focus is here placed onto dimensions of protest in 
events where people ‘march long distances, go willingly to jail, welcome or provoke the 
                                                     
7
 Costica Bradatan, ‘A Light for the Future: On the Political Uses of a Dying Body’,  Dissent, 23 May 2011 
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/a-light-for-the-future-on-the-political-uses-of-a-dying-body 
[accessed 22 April 2013]  
8
 Stuart J. Murray, ‘Thanatopolitics: On the Use of Death for Mobilizing Political Life’,  Polygraph, 18 (2006), 
p. 191-215. 
9
 See Biggs, ‘When Costs are Beneficial: Protest as Communicative Suffering’ (2003) and ‘Dying without 
Killing: Protest by Self-Immolation, 1963-2002’ (2005). 
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blows of police, refuse to eat, and even kill themselves’.10 In that sense, he insists on the 
efficacy of the ‘dramaturgy of suffering’ in comparison to the effects produced by merely 
symbolic actions in civic protest events and, more importantly, adds that ‘self-immolation—
where someone kills him or herself for a cause, without harming others—reveals the various 
ways in which suffering can become a source of power’ (my emphasis).11 This comes about 
due to the fact that suffering belongs to the realm of the real (and not of the symbolic) so it 
imposes real-life costs, beyond dramatic symbolization. In other words, there is ‘a 
terminological distinction between the drama of burning a flag and that of burning oneself 
[…] self-immolation by fire is so awful (in the archaic as well as modern sense of the word) 
because the suffering is real and not (merely) symbolic. Burning oneself in effigy would not 
have the same effect’.12 What is the ‘effect’ Biggs talks about and how does it connect with 
the idea of power? To answer these questions, I will bring forward a visual example without 
ever showing it. Let us “observe” it by way of narrative description from a viewpoint that I 
shall call an “ignorant” gaze. 
An ‘Ignorant’ Gaze 
There is a photographic image from which my analysis departs. In its right bottom corner the 
morning hour (9:30AM) is indicated, most probably the moment when the image was 
recorded. In the foreground we can see the following: a single human being in the centre, 
around him or her there is something resembling fire, as well as a small object to the left. 
These elements are situated on what appears to be street-like terrain. In the background of 
the image we can see: a car (to the left), some people’s faces behind the car, wreaths of 
smoke around, and a few more human figures to the right. The latter are recognisable only 
by their lower parts: their faces remain invisible due to the smoke-cover in front. This is the 
basic description of the image.  
Let us now focus on the human presence in the picture. All the human beings share some 
common aspects: their features are associative of the populations of Asian origin; their 
dresses also look alike and seem to be homogenous, as if they are wearing some sort of 
uniform. The clothing of the central figure is more difficult to properly identify. The same 
goes for the “faceless” figures behind him or her: only their lower parts are revealed in what 
seems to be their long robes and sandals. To detect what the rest of the people are wearing—
those behind the car—is an impossible task. Beside the human beings, the non-human 
elements also make a part of the image. The foreground object to the left gives an idea of a 
plastic canister. The canister is cut by the frame and only one part of it is exposed. We may 
presume that the reproduction of the image at hand is not an integral but a cropped version of 
the original (unless it was the photographer’s intention to have this cut so disturbingly 
                                                     
10
 Biggs, ‘When Costs are Beneficial: Protest as Communicative Suffering’, p. 2. 
11
 See Michael Biggs, ‘Hunger Strikes by Suffragettes and Irish Republicans, 1909-1923’, University of Oxford 
online database, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfos0060/hungerstrikes.shtml [accessed 25 April 2013]  
12
 Biggs, ‘When Costs are Beneficial: Protest as Communicative Suffering’, p. 6. 
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noticeable). The exact brand of the car in the back—evidently an ordinary, passenger type—
remains unknown to us; for those who seem to be less ignorant it is crystal clear that it must 
be a sedan.
13
 Its hood is open: nobody is inside the car or, at least, it seems to be the case. 
The very last layer at the background of the image remains unidentifiable. However, a more 
curious observer could have already found some other versions of the image in numerous 
reproductions available on the Internet, with expanded views of the same scene. They show 
some kind of architectural setting in the background. It is composed of small, simple house-
like constructions. Additionally, a traffic-light at the far right clearly indicates the street-like 
open-air environment. It includes the presence of some other people at the far left and behind 
“the people behind the car”. The casual clothes makes them look different from the 
aforementioned majority in their, at first instance, strange uniforms. 
This rudimentary mode of analysis strips the image of its initial visual “mystery” and 
provides its first iconographic layer of meaning. It detects the main and the side elements of 
the image, their mutual positions in the overall composition within the given size and depth 
of the visual field, and identifies certain attributes and details as more or less recognisable 
with respect to the human figures and objects therein. What this level of interpretation does 
not do is far more complex and challenging. Suffice to say that, for the moment, nothing 
indicates any particular—or particularly exciting—significance in this image in comparison 
to any other: nothing gives us a hint that it could be turned from a mere document recording 
some trivial event into one of the most iconic images of the twentieth century. Given our 
preliminary visual experience of its current status (more or less ordinary), I propose to have 
our current viewpoint called the “ignorant” gaze. The “ignorance” refers to our limited 
capacity so that we barely understand what we are looking at apart from the basic graphic 
contents of the image. For a better pronounced comprehension of its more exhaustive layers 
of meaning, one needs to account for a better informed viewpoint, which is supplementary to 
the “ignorant” one. The first set of questions which arise in this regard are as follows: What 
is it precisely that we are looking at? Where does it come from? Who made it, when and 
why? For whom was it made? What does it “do” to the viewer? Finally, what is the whole 
purpose of our discussion about this image? 
In the narrative proposed from the outset of this paper (‘Have you ever seen a human being 
burning in front of your eyes?’, and so on), the rigidity of certain formal criteria proper to 
academic papers has been intentionally avoided. Instead, I have opted for a somewhat 
unusual “dramaturgy” of storytelling in order to accentuate the very nature of rhetorical 
power behind the central subject of our concern: images of a burning human body. In other 
words, what plays the major role in this scenario around people setting themselves on fire is 
neither a human being engulfed in flames nor his/her body burning: rather, it is the image (of 
suffering) itself—the image of a publicly exposed human being who suffers in-between the 
states of life and death (a ‘living dead’), while his/her body is burning in front of our eyes. I 
will now take a less “dramatic” tone towards the phenomenon of self-immolation in order to 
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approach it within the limits given by actual scholarship on this and related issues. This is a 
necessary step for any further analysis. At a later point of discussion it will bring us back, 
once again, to the ‘mysterious’ image, while allowing us to see it from another perspective: 
in a visually more “literate” and better “informed” manner than the “ignorant” one I have 
proposed at the beginning. 
A ‘receptive’ gaze 
What is exactly displayed by the image of the burning human body earlier described? It is 
my hope that a clear-cut answer to this question will not only challenge the arguments here 
exposed but will also provide some less “ignorant” viewpoints onto the entire landscape of 
meaning where the “drama” of image-analysis needs to be grounded in order for the story to 
be completed as it should. My aim is to show that it is not ‘death itself’ (of a human being 
burning in front of our eyes) that we see in the image but something else, verging in-between 
‘life’ and ‘death’: a very particular aspect of photography that makes the (visual) rhetoric of 
self-immolation not only properly thanatopolitical but also ethical, in the sense that the 
notion of suffering combines with what I shall call the “image ethics”.  
This aspect revolves around the fact that what we see is a human being (a “duplicate” of our 
own selves): a man, burning—no more alive but also not yet dead, caught in-between the 
zones of ‘life’ and ‘death’ and suffering in the process. What we look at is a ‘living dead’ 
suffering in front of our eyes, whose silence and stillness are not due to the state of “death” 
(which, for a ‘living dead’, has already happened in this life) but due to the liminal state of 
being through which he exerts his power onto the viewers: the power to confront “death 
itself” not by escaping it but by claiming something “unthinkable” and “unimaginable”—his 
own right to it. Through suffering (that comes less from the very process of burning and 
more from the sense of injustice, which made him set himself alight), he does not ‘take his 
own life’—in the clinical sense of the word applicable to so-called suicides—but instead he 
takes his own death back to himself. And he does so in the face of sovereign (necro-) power 
that, in the given context, holds the keys to the ‘death-worlds’ or ‘new and unique forms of 
social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon 
them the status of living dead’ and, supposedly, also to ‘death itself’.14 To take one’s own 
death back to oneself—from sovereign necropower (and its self-proclaimed privilege to 
decide about the populations’ lives and deaths on the basis of human mortality, in Mbembe’s 
terms)—means, in the way I expose it here, to claim one’s own right to death itself. 
On one side, for a burning man who communicates his suffering from the position of a 
‘living dead’, ‘life’ is but a domain already invaded, contaminated and colonised by 
sovereign power. For a ‘living dead’, life is reduced and assimilated with death to the point 
where “death itself” remains the only dominion to exercise personal control over one’s own 
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self against the ultimate control of the Other (i.e., sovereign necropower). To transgress the 
epistemic border imposed by “death” and get access through it, which brings him closer to 
‘discovering what prevents a human being from knowing himself as he is in reality’,15 makes 
his act tantamount to the epistemological break: he is discarding the ultimate legitimacy of 
epistemic sovereignty by discarding his own status of a ‘living dead’. On the other side, it is 
through the reproduction (re-creation) of oneself in the image-world—while burning, before 
the moment of ‘fiery death’ actually occurs—that a ‘living dead’ exposes the image of his 
suffering to the world: not his dead body but the process towards it (a process emotionally 
powerful though brief). Here I imply the process where the notion of suffering and the notion 
of ‘image’ intertwine to the extent that they invite my ‘receptive gaze’ to identify and 
recognise (the implication of) my own self in the scene: to look at a ‘mirror’, in empathy 
with the object of looking, as if it were myself—which is exactly the moment when the 
ethical interrupts the epistemological, as proposed, for instance, by Gayatri Spivak.
16
 So, for 
the epistemic border—imposed by “death”—to be transgressed, an ethical border needs to be 
dismantled through and across the image of the other as one’s own self. It is, perhaps, in this 
ethical instance where the effective and persuasive power of self-immolation (as a properly 
thanatopolitical regime of self-sacrifice) ultimately resides. Without it, no self-immolation 
and no image depicting it could claim to operate in a system that mobilises one’s own death 
for the sake of survivors. 
The image of ‘a man, burning’, that I continuously refer to in this paper, is anything but 
ordinary: on the contrary, it has a very particular status both in the history of photography 
and in the history of self-immolation. Hence, when I talk about the photography of a burning 
man I have in mind the very precise image: the one I have seen in the recent study analysing 
‘the rhetorical nature of the picture itself and the act of self-immolation’.17 It was published 
on page fifteen of the scholarly article written by the rhetorical critic Michelle Murray Yang 
(2011) and titled ‘Still Burning. Self-Immolation as a Photographic Protest’. According to 
the author herself, the image she uses in her study is a reproduction of a photograph taken by 
Malcolm Browne as it appeared in the U.S. daily newspaper Philadelphia Inquirer on June 
12, 1963. Evidently, I pay too much attention to the issue of its exact origins. This is not 
without a valid reason: instead of opting for numerous and modified reproductions of the 
same image available across the media (including, most notably, the internet), it is Yang’s 
article that has provided the visual reference for my present study around a ‘burning man’. 
Moreover, it is her analysis that has significantly informed the very dramaturgy of my own 
“scenario” around the image that has been of concern to both of us (I would dare to say that 
this image is, even more importantly, of ethical concern to humankind as such). 
There are several particular features of that precise image which make it valid for the present 
analysis. One of them consists in the fact that Yang uses, and rightfully so, the reproduction 
of the original version, that is, the image as it appeared in print media in the United States in 
1963 only a day after it was taken. Hence, it is significant insofar as we assume that this 
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 Bernard N. Schumacher, Death and Mortality in Contemporary Philosophy (Cambridge University Press: 
New York, 2010), p. 213. 
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 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Terror: A Speech Act After 9-11’, boundary 2, 31:2 (2004), 81 –111 (p. 83). 
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 Yang, p. 4. 
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version—printed and publicly distributed before any other variant of the same image or of 
the same event—is the very image imprinted into the collective memory of humankind ever 
since it was exposed to it for the first time. Via its reproduction in Yang’s article it is brought 
to light again in the way it was published and publicly distributed for the first time fifty years 
ago. This version corresponds to the black-and-white still photograph of the so-called 
‘Burning Monk’. For the purposes of this paper I have renamed it, preferably in my view, to 
“A Man, Burning”, for several reasons. First, because it is considered to be a defining image 
of the burning human body in the context of self-immolation as a form of protest.
18
 Second, 
because the burning human body at hand is considered to belong to a “man” instead of 
exclusively to a monk, that is, to a human being (in this case male) who—beside the 
predominantly religious role that he played in one particular society (in this case South 
Vietnamese)—also inscribed himself into the global history of civic social movements by 
means of this photograph as a citizen of that society, regardless of his profession. Third, 
because I intend to pose one question, hopefully significant enough, by pointing out his 
status of a “man” (i.e., a human being) rather than of a “monk” (who is also a male): the 
question about humankind at large and what it means to be human for the one who submits 
him- or herself to the act of self-sacrifice by fire, but also for the ones who observe such an 
act. My assumption is that the question of our humanness at large intertwines with and 
depends upon the potential implications relating to us (as observers) within the given ethical 
frameworks around the image of ‘a man, burning’.  
These points allow me to explain the reason why this and no other image (of the same man, 
burning; of the same event; or of other similar events coming after June 1963) is so 
important for the present study. I consider the difference between the “defining” image and 
all the other possible versions or examples to be crucial. By “other” images I refer to three 
distinctive categories: numerous copies of the exact same image, available elsewhere other 
than the primary source of appearance—the Philadelphia Inquirer, ‘the first American 
newspaper to print the image’ (Yang 2011: 4);19 a variety of other representations within the 
same “family” of images and pertaining to the same burning human body (recorded 
numerous times, from various angles, in various positions and various states of burning 
during the ten-minute period of the monk’s self-immolation); and a variety of images 
applicable to other burning human bodies in their own acts of self-immolation, following the 
exemplary case which I am here discussing. Since I have excluded all the outlined 
categories, my preference towards a selected singular image (distinguishes it from the rest 
for the following reason: it was the first one to be publicly exposed. Moreover, unlike its 
consequent variations as technically and digitally modified views of the same scene, it was 
the first photographic record of the act of self-immolation in history, ever—if by the notion 
of ‘self-immolation’ we still understand the act of protest executed by setting oneself alight 
without harming anyone else.
20
 In that sense, the visual impact it exerted onto the virtual 
community of international viewers (first and foremost in the United States, where it was 
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 Biggs, ‘Dying without Killing: Protest by Self-Immolation, 1963-2002’. 
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 Yang, p. 4. 
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 This, however, is not always the case: following Biggs, his typology introduces an important distinction 
between this and other types of sacrifice, such as ‘suicide attacks’, hunger strikes, and so on (Biggs 2012a, 
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published) could be comparable, in a more up-to-date perspective, to the ‘unimaginable’ 
sights of shocking accidents or events broadcasted live over television networks—such as 
the explosion of the NASA Challenger Shuttle live in front of millions of television viewers 
in 1986 or the more recent live camera-recording of the New York’s World Trade Center 
collapse during the “cinematic” crash of a (second) plane into one of its buildings.21 Yet, 
unlike these two examples, what we—as observers— witness in the photography of ‘a man, 
burning’ is the fixation of a body in pain, the sense of suffering we immediately relate to 
every time we take a look at the image while presuming that his stillness and silence disclose 
something almost unnatural and surreal. If self-immolation, ‘the most awful example of self-
inflicted suffering’,22 had hitherto been ‘unimaginable’ to humankind, that is until the 
appearance of Malcolm Browne’s photograph in the news in 1963, then what is it exactly 
that makes it still so significant, so iconic and so “defining” for the representation of 
suffering aligned with self-sacrifice by fire? 
Browne’s photograph was published with an accompanying caption: ‘An elderly Buddhist 
monk, the Rev. Quang Duc, is engulfed in flames as he burns himself to death in Saigon, 
Vietnam, in protest against persecution’.23 This piece of information is sufficient to disturb 
the preliminary “ignorant” viewpoint we used about the decontextualized contents of the 
image as earlier described, and now provides the very basic framework within which to 
situate the plot behind the scene. Yang takes this framework as a point of departure in her 
own article: the case of self-immolation as it was enacted on the morning of June 11, 1963, 
in Saigon (South Vietnam) by a local male Buddhist monk. His real name was, in a slightly 
Latinized transcription of its more complicated original version, Thich Quang Duc. This 
brief piece of textual information brings some new elements to the “visual evidence” of the 
recorded event. It frames the image in a way that takes the veil of anonymity off its main 
protagonist and makes him more familiar to the public. Once his personal name is revealed 
(‘Quang Duc’) we also realise that he is not an ordinary citizen. The fact that he is presented 
as ‘an elderly Buddhist monk’ immediately denotes his professional orientation (a priest) and 
his rank in the religious hierarchy to which he belongs (his honourable status, a reverend). 
These features ground his personality within the sphere of public responsibilities instead of 
identifying him as a mere layman. Besides, he is presented as a senior figure (‘elderly’). 
Why is this piece of information important? It is because it reveals a certain age-bound 
(though not officially the highest) authority within the local hierarchy of the South 
Vietnamese Buddhist congregation (yet, the highest authority still had to be asked for an 
official endorsement so that Quang Duc’s act could be formally sanctioned). This was a 
necessary institutional provision in order for his desire and decision to be finally fulfilled: ‘In 
1963 Buddhist leaders explicitly sanctioned two deaths: those of Quang Duc and Thich Tieu 
Dieu. Both were elderly, while there is evidence that younger novices were refused 
permission. This is understandable: the elderly had less life to sacrifice and had presumably 
attained sufficient wisdom to make a responsible choice’.24 It is therefore worth repeating 
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that the main protagonist of the image was a mature, sixty-seven year-old male, who was 
also the representative of a local clerical order. These basic facts weave a thread of complex 
meanings, and sometimes also confusions, into the motivations surrounding Quang Duc’s 
readiness to offer his life in the act of self-immolation ‘in protest against persecution’. This 
is where we find out the inextricable connection between the ideas of self-immolation and 
protest for the first time. The next questions are: what kind of persecution and what kind of 
protest are here announced? To come to this point, let us briefly consider, first of all, the role 
played by the photographer himself. 
The image is considered to be iconic of the context defined by the Vietnam War (1956–
1975), the conflict between North and South Vietnam where both parties were respectively 
supported by their communist and non-communist allies (China and the United States, most 
notably). The so-called ‘Burning Monk’ belongs to a series of photographs recorded in South 
Vietnam by the same author, recently deceased, Malcolm Browne (1931–2012). Browne was 
a U.S. citizen and appointed chief of the Associated Press (AP) office in Saigon during the 
war. The biographical note from a British newspaper’s obituary on the occasion of his death 
gives some basic ideas about Browne’s early days. There we learn about his appointment to 
the AP ‘which sent him to Saigon in 1961’.25 As a news correspondent and photojournalist, 
he distinguished himself for several reasons. By having photographed Thich Quang Duc 
burning in 1963, he won, together with David Halberstam of the New York Times, the 1964 
Pulitzer Prize for ‘their individual reporting of the Vietnam war and the overthrow of the 
Diem regime’.26 What made him popular even before this occasion was, first and foremost, 
his ethical position: he was known for his sceptical and critical stance towards the Vietnam 
war, something which was also shared by his closest colleagues. As he was ‘extremely 
critical of how the war was being fought, [it] had an immense influence on opinion back 
home’ (my emphasis).27 The ‘encounter’ between Browne and Quang Duc took place in this 
context, heavily charged with local and international tensions. This is also the context in 
which two ethical stances positively merged with each other: Browne’s disapproval of his 
own country’s military intervention in South Vietnam, and Quang Duc’s disapproval of his 
own country’s militant intervention against the Buddhists in South Vietnam (that is, the part 
of Vietnam supported by Browne’s country). This regime was represented by the president 
Ngo Dinh Diem, who enjoyed the support of the United States at the time and was known for 
favouring the Catholic minority in the country while pursuing an extreme anti-Buddhist 
position.
28
  
Given that Quang Duc, a Buddhist, set himself alight in protest against the local, religiously 
oppressive political regime, what needs to be addressed with regard to his motivations to ‘die 
for a cause’ is the connection between their political and religious dimensions as perceived 
together. Although it has not been rare to consider them separately, and with due reasons 
(given the historical background of the phenomenon, as I have earlier described), Biggs 
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insists on the combination of the two: when coupled with technological innovations 
(photography in the first place), this allowed for the emergence of a fundamentally novel 
concept (Biggs calls it a ‘cultural invention’) and impact produced therein. In that regard, he 
explains that ‘we can certainly find examples of self-immolation before 1963, but these were 
isolated incidents or episodes; they did not inspire people elsewhere to sacrifice 
themselves’.29 So what is it exactly that makes Quang Duc’s case of self-immolation a 
cornerstone event in the history of this act? According to Biggs, it closely relates to his 
historical impact on self-immolation worldwide in relation to the following facts: ‘Quang 
Duc was the progenitor of the great majority of these acts including almost every case in 
which fire was used; they were modelled either directly on his action or indirectly on 
another’s action that can in turn be traced back to him’ (my emphasis).30 This means that 
with Quang Duc (and Malcolm Browne) originated ‘the modern lineage of self-immolation 
[…] subsequently diffused to dozens of countries’ (Biggs 2005: 175).31 This also proves, 
though not always but only under certain conditions, that ‘the clustering of self-immolation 
in waves reveals how one individual’s action tends to inspire others to imitate it’,32 most 
notably for explicitly political reasons—which makes a big difference in comparison to 
strictly religious/spiritual motivations pertaining to the earlier cases of self-immolation 
informed by the Buddhist tradition.
33
 As Bradatan (2011) points out, ‘self-immolation in the 
Buddhist tradition is not the same thing as political self-immolation: the mindsets and 
motivations involved are different, and so is the societal impact. Yet even though the 
importance of religious-cultural background is undeniable in the case of the Vietnamese 
monks, political self-immolations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have become a 
major symbolic gesture in their own right’ (my emphasis).34 If the 1963 action did indeed 
inspire many others (whose cases of ‘fiery death’ were unrelated to Buddhist causes in South 
Vietnam, even though they were related to Quang Duc’s method) to imitate it elsewhere, one 
thing is certain: this would have been impossible, “unimaginable”, and “unthinkable” 
without what Biggs calls the ‘cultural innovation’ of Quang Duc. In his own words, ‘like any 
cultural innovation, this was a creative mutation of pre-existing elements [or] creative 
redeployment of religious tradition in political struggle’.35 In that sense, his arguments give 
high priority to the presence of the photographer, the photographic medium itself and the 
                                                     
29
 Biggs, ‘Dying without Killing: Protest by Self-Immolation’, 1963-2002’, p. 178. 
30
 ibid., p. 174. 
31
 In Biggs’s estimate, ‘there have been between 800 and 3,000 individual acts of self-immolation, including 
non-fatal attempts, in the four decades since 1963’ (Biggs 2005: 174). In his more updated estimate, from a 
perspective focused on the ongoing waves of self-immolating protests among the Tibetans in China, Biggs 
claims that, since the period 1963-1970, ‘suicide protest was now indelibly associated with burning. Suicide 
protests before 1963 had not used fire, but other means of death. Since 1963, 85% of individuals have chosen 
burning. The imprint of Quang Duc’s action endures’ (Biggs 2012a: 146). Furthermore, the novel method has 
paralleled the increase of the annual rate of suicide protests: ‘Compared to the period 1919-1962, [it] was 
seventeen times higher in the period 1963-1970. Even excluding South Vietnam, the annual rate was eight times 
higher’ (Biggs 2012a: 146). 
32
 Biggs, ‘Dying without Killing: Protest by Self-Immolation’, 1963-2002’, p. 175. 
33
 See Crosby et al., ‘Suicide By Fire: a Contemporary Method of Political Protest’ (1977); James A. Benn., 
Burning for the Buddha: Self-Immolation in Chinese Buddhism (2007); and Biggs ‘Self-Immolation in Context, 
1963-2012’ (2012a). 
34
Bradatan, ‘A Light for the Future: On the Political Uses of a Dying Body’. 
35
 Biggs, ‘Dying without Killing: Protest by Self-Immolation’, 1963-2002’, p. 321. 
Stamenkovic, ‘A Man, Burning’   48 
 
role it played around Quang Duc. Hence, the religious and political dimensions of the event 
here mutated into a configuration that allowed for the act of self-immolation to have itself 
transformed before inducing a transforming (thanatopolitical) effect in the observers. With 
Quang Duc, self-immolation entered a properly civic context due to the communication of 
protest (through suffering) mediated by a single photography in a manner so far 
unprecedented: 
 Quang Duc’s death by fire in 1963 was different because it inspired many others. As a 
 result of his act, within a few years self-immolation entered the global ‘repertoire’ of 
 protest (Tilly 1986). His act was an unexpected combination of modern technology and 
 religious tradition. The availability of flammable liquids like petrol and kerosene made 
 it feasible to burn oneself in a public space; without instant ignition, police could 
 thwart any attempt. The advent of photography—and technologies for the rapid 
 transmission and cheap reproduction of images—made it possible for a single sacrifice 
 to have a dramatic impact on a huge audience. These potentialities, however, were 
 discovered only in 1963 (my emphasis).
36
  
Biggs here points out the significance of photography, and the development of ‘technologies 
for the rapid transmission and cheap reproduction of images’ as crucial for the dissemination 
of Quang Duc’s message to the world in the aftermath of the event. But this also relates to 
another significant decision preceding the event itself, because ‘when Quang Duc offered his 
life for the cause, the movement leaders initially spurned the idea’.37 If the issue of age 
played an important role for Quang Duc’s community of fellow Buddhists to sanction his 
decision to ‘die for a cause’, the photographic element was even more significant. It was 
precisely the Buddhist leaders’ awareness about the role that images could play, especially in 
the diffused manner of media impact that turned their preliminary negative stance in another 
direction. In that sense, the issue of gaining this formal sanction would probably not have 
been that easily resolved without the support expressed by a single monk in favour of Quang 
Duc’s proposal. His name was Thich Duc Nghiep; he was ‘fluent in English [and] in charge 
of relations with foreign journalists. Did he grasp the potential impact on the American 
audience? After several days of prayer and fast, Quang Duc eventually won approval’ (Biggs 
2005: 179).
38
 In the scenario of little steps leading towards a potentially huge event, it was 
also Thich Duc Nghiep from whom ‘on the evening of June 10, 1963, American news 
correspondent Malcolm Browne received a cryptic phone call [to be informed of] a large 
protest planned for the following day by South Vietnamese Buddhists. Nghiep mysteriously 
added, ‘I would advise you to come. Something very important may happen’.39 And 
something very important happened, indeed. Yet, the importance of the local event (that had 
an unprecedented global impact) would have never been achieved or correctly 
comprehended without the complex (and, to a certain extent, unforeseeable) configuration of 
meanings that shaped the process around the event—before it took place, while it was taking 
place and, consequently, in its aftermath.  
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What Biggs only outlines with regard to the photographic recording of self-immolation, 
Yang expands much further: she places an accent on the aspect of human suffering ‘frozen in 
time’ by means of photographic recording. For her, the rhetorical power of the image itself 
would be unthinkable without the keynote element: understanding the configuration of self-
sacrifice by fire vis-à-vis the image/suffering axis. This indicates that the ‘advent of 
photography and technologies for the rapid transmission and cheap reproduction of images’ 
(as Biggs maintains) were an important but not a decisive element: for the “defining” image 
of a burning man to exert its communicative power onto the viewers and achieve its 
public/political effect, the relationship between suffering and image is crucial. This condition 
pertains to one very particular visual property, a kind of tension occurring within the 
photographic image itself—its suspension in time, as Yang describes it, that provides the 
main substance to the viewer’s confrontation with the representation of a man who is not 
only ‘burning’ in front of our eyes, but does so continually. What the image of a ‘burning 
man’ exposes to us today is the mere fact of a continuous protest of a human being ‘not yet 
dead’: the self-immolator is “still burning” whenever we cast a look upon him, insofar as we 
have the “defining” image in front of our eyes. Let us be attentive to what Yang has to say 
(especially at the end of her own description of the “defining” image from an “informed” 
perspective), which now properly contextualizes the previously “decontextualized” contents 
which, as I had earlier suggested, are only from an “ignorant” perspective: 
 In the centre of the image, Duc sits on the street as flames lap at half of his body and 
 his face. To the monk’s left sits the gasoline container used to transport the fuel, which 
 ignited his body. Behind Duc is the sedan that he and three other monks rode in during 
 the processional through the streets of Saigon. In the background is a line of Buddhist 
 monks and nuns witnessing the event unfold. While one can faintly make out some of 
 their features, it is impossible to accurately view their facial expressions. To the right 
 of the sedan, one sees what appears to be the lower half of a monk’s body who appears 
 to be walking away or walking towards the burning man. It is difficult to discern the 
 direction of his movement as the upper half of the monk’s body is hidden by the cloud 
 of smoke and flames radiating from Duc. […] From the angle that the picture was 
 taken, it appears that only half of Quang Duc’s body is engulfed in flames (my 
 emphasis).
40
 
According to her description, the burning man is not represented as terminally and 
irrevocably dead (since ‘flames lap at half of his body and his face’). Even if we assume that 
death could have arrived to him while ‘only half of Quang Duc’s body is engulfed in 
flames’, we do not actually see ‘death itself’ in this image or, to be exact, we do not see the 
corpse of a human being engulfed in flames or covered in ashes. In that regard, it is worth 
comparing the image I keep referring to as the “defining” image with another image of the 
same event that Yang also takes into consideration (an interested reader might want to 
consult how the image looks like on page twenty-three in Yang’s article). She makes a clear 
distinction between—at least—two photographic records from the same family of images 
revolving around the event of interest. ‘It is important to note that while this image was shot 
by [the same photographer] Browne, it [the second image] is not the same one that appeared 
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. In this photograph the monk is completely engulfed in flames, 
i.e., he is represented as irrevocably dead—a corpse. Beneath the picture in bold capital 
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letters reads [a] declaration, ‘We, too, protest’” (my emphasis).41 This other image appeared 
a bit later than the first one—namely on June 27, 1963 and September 15, 1963—and in 
another U.S. newspaper (the New York Times, the paper that initially refused to publish the 
“defining” image in the immediate aftermath of the event). As pointed out by Yang, it was 
‘appropriated by other Vietnam War protestors’ and appeared in ‘two advertisements created 
by the Ministers’ Vietnam Committee, which used the picture to gain support for the anti-
war movement’.42 Furthermore, Yang says: 
 The use of Browne’s photograph in the ad enables supporters of the campaign to 
 rhetorically join Quang Duc’s visual protest through textual discourse. By declaring 
 ‘we, too, protest,’ and including an image of the monk’s immolation, the organization 
 is rhetorically entering into Quang Duc’s act of protest. Although The Ministers’ 
 Vietnam Committee takes a very different approach in expressing its protest than 
 Quang Duc, the organization identifies its cause and its concerns with those of the 
 burning monk and, therefore, conveys a sense of solidarity with the South Vietnamese 
 Buddhists (my emphasis).
 43
 
The existence of another image is here significant as it allows us to grasp the difference 
between the visual power of a ‘burning man’ who suffers and a ‘burning man’ who is 
already dead. What this difference effectuates in the eye of a spectator is the kind of impact 
it produces with respect to the image of a man suffering yet still alive, on the one hand, and 
the image of his corpse, on the other. This brings the aspect of the (in)visibility of ‘death 
itself’ and the visibility of suffering ‘suspended in time’, which is a crucial point for this 
paper. It brings to mind Mbembe’s suggestion concerning the ‘death worlds’ of social 
existence, forcing a human being to engage in an act as unimaginably painful as self-
sacrifice by fire in response to the conditions that created such ‘death worlds’ (i.e., properly 
necropolitical conditions). This is but a possible framework through which to observe and 
analyse the complexity of death’s ‘ambiguity’ (the life-and-death’s in-betweenness of the 
burning man, so to speak) among the varied cases of self-sacrifice as a properly 
thanatopolitical response to the necropolitical sovereignty of death. Quang Duc’s case (and 
the “defining” image of his burning) is paradigmatic for such thanatopolitical practice, and 
relates to other exemplary case studies unrelated to Biggs’s definition of the act (the 
Palestinian ‘suicide bombers’, the so-called economic suicides in the crisis-driven South of 
Europe, or even the candidates for assisted suicide in contemporary Switzerland, for 
instance). To complete the segment about her own account of Quang Duc’s 
(constructive/thanatopolitical) power of burning himself in the ‘defining’ image, I want to 
point out the most significant part in Yang’s description—the fact ‘that there is a chance that 
the events which caused him to take such drastic measures can somehow be ameliorated’.44 
Yang says that: 
 The viewer can clearly see one of his tightly shut eyes and half of his gaunt mouth. In 
 this instant, the monk’s death is indefinitely suspended in time. The flames have not yet 
 overcome his entire body; his demise is not yet complete. For a brief moment, captured 
 by film, it appears that the outcome of this event can be altered. Quang Duc is not yet 
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 dead; there is a chance that the events which caused him to take such drastic measures 
 can somehow be ameliorated.
45
 
Yang does not speak of thanatopolitics at all—yet, her point here gets very close to this 
faculty of death-politics. This means that self-immolation, as an extreme form of protest, 
aims at raising attention for the greater cause for which one burns him or herself. By this I 
understand that the attention to the act—but also to the cause itself—is potentially increased 
through the very act of withdrawing oneself from the world, and radically so: not only by 
setting oneself alight in merely corporeal terms but also by “bringing to light” the very 
cause, otherwise silenced or obscured, for which one decides to set oneself alight at all. As 
Yang argues, for this act to make an impact it has to be ‘indefinitely suspended in time’; for 
the indefinite suspension to last it has to be visually recorded and turned into an image that 
‘survives’ the act itself; for this kind of survival it is not the mere material existence of the 
visual record that counts but its public exposure in terms of hyper-visibility. Hence, to 
expose one’s own body to others during the act of self-immolation means to bring oneself to 
light (literally, while burning in flames), to bring the common cause to “public light”, and to 
do so in view of other people (the high-ranking officials, one’s own fellow community, 
and/or the anonymous mass of worldwide media observers). Again, the image of one’s own 
suffering put on public display (instead of one’s own corpse) is here crucial. 
The Image Character of the Ethical 
If the public visibility of suffering ‘suspended in time’, rather than death itself, takes the 
most prominent role in the effectiveness of self-immolation in protest (as described above 
with regard to the ‘burning man’), this obliges us to rethink the intricate relationship between 
the notions of images and suffering: how they partake in what Biggs calls ‘communicative 
suffering’ and how, in turn, the viewers could recognize themselves in these images by 
responding to such a communication. By the notions of ‘communication’ and ‘response’ I do 
not hereby denote the moralising reaction of a bystander who possibly aims at ‘altering the 
outcome of this event’ by disturbing the protagonist’s decision to burn himself to death (in 
order to “save him” from dying, eventually). Instead, I refer to our potentiality, as observers, 
to empathise with the human being burning and suffering in the process and to recognise the 
‘image character of the ethical’, which is a necessary precondition for the thanatopolitical 
power of self-immolation to occur.
46
 What characterises the image-character of the ethical? 
The emotional and political power of visual records configured by the empathising elements 
of thanatopolitics is defined by Yang as an instant (of the monk’s death) indefinitely 
suspended in time. Therefore, the dimension tantamount to the issue of power in the context 
of ‘communicative suffering’ is not the image itself—although it pertains to the visual 
evidence of the image-world—but the human condition itself, hereby defined as “suffering 
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by self-inflicted burning”. Furthermore, it is the human condition under particular 
circumstances: caught in a timely aspect of delay. This discloses the way according to which 
‘images of people in pain seem to prolong a subject’s victimization by fixing situations of 
suffering and immobilizing a human subject as a victim’ (my emphasis).47 Moreover, such 
images ‘may also undermine reductionist victimization. They show that this subject is much 
more than a victim: he or she is a human being with whom we, the viewers, have something 
in common. Images underline the ‘commonalities of being human’ (my emphasis).48  
If it is the vulnerability of the others, as Möller says, that I can experience as my own (rather 
than their status of a victim or the violence enacted upon them therein), then my own 
viewing relationship to the subjects of suffering can be emphasised through what binds us 
together as properly human beings. Another argument, shaped by the philosopher J.M. 
Bernstein, goes more precisely along this direction: it focuses on the synthesis between two 
types of ontologies in charge of our reception of the idea and the meaning of vulnerability. 
The argument consists, namely, in that ‘the ontology of the photographic image is, at least in 
part, an ethical ontology of the human, a framing of the meaning of the human through its 
singular, always vulnerable bodily appearing’.49 Accordingly, he contends, our vulnerability 
to violence is what allows us to be perceived through images not as images themselves but as 
properly human beings, captured by photography in all our ‘helplessness and vulnerability 
before the eyes of all others’: 
 What makes humans vulnerable to violence is, however, equally what allows them to 
 be seen, imaged, painted, photographed, filmed, or videoed. Photography—with its 
 inevitable indexical moment, with that moment’s attendant realist excess—has become 
 a site of anxiety not because images of the body in pain raise intransigent ethical 
 questions about the production, distribution, and consumption of such images, although 
 they do, but rather because each photographic image pins the human to its helplessness 
 and vulnerability before the eyes of all others. In its capture of human vulnerability, the 
 domain of the photographic image of the human is coextensive with the ethical claim of 
 the human body (my emphasis).
50
 
In that sense, due attention has to be paid to ‘displays of suffering as formative phenomena 
of our experience of the visual world’.51 This is also the reason why the image of a dying 
body—and not of an already dead body—is more powerful in exerting the ‘communicative 
power of suffering’ onto its onlookers. This complies with Bernstein’s understanding that 
ethics begins ‘with the image of another, who already matters to me, in such pain as to 
require my intervention, my doing something: protecting, healing, or providing solace’.52 
However, if the self-immolator is dead I can hardly do anything for him or her that would 
benefit his or her liberation from suffering—unless this person prefers to die. Those who 
immolate themselves prefer to die, and they prefer to do so in protest—for a cause which 
they aim to achieve through the very act of dying. So, how could “my doing something” 
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contribute to such a preference on behalf of the self-immolator if I am expected to react by 
‘protecting, healing, or providing solace’ to the one who has already submitted himself to the 
act of ‘dying by fiery death’? In Quang Duc’s case, for instance, such an intervention was 
never meant to be done, it was not even expected from the viewers. This is not due to the 
fact that none of the people looking at Quang Duc’s self-immolation (including the 
photographer himself) were unable to sufficiently empathise with the burning man, but 
because the intervention itself was imagined on completely different grounds: if the act was 
disturbed, it would have meant ‘saving one person’s life’ while allowing for the death of 
many others to keep occurring in the name of the necropolitical regime of power. In other 
words, it would have meant a tacit approval of the necropolitical regime. Contrary to that, 
what was necessary for the ‘intervention’ to properly occur consisted in the expected visual 
materialisation of the event: into a first-hand public testimony (the self-immolation was 
taking place in view of the others, who timely brought themselves around Quang Duc while 
he was burning), but also into a second-hand public testimony—via photographic images. In 
turn, the visual impact thus produced was expected to provoke a large public response (both 
within the given locality of South Vietnam and abroad) and to galvanise a wave of necessary 
political transformations—which is what actually happened. Disabling Quang Duc’s action 
for the sake of ‘saving his life’ would have probably provoked a different chain of public 
reactions while it would have, almost certainly, destroyed the initially conceived 
(constructive, positive, transformative) thanatopolitical potential of his engagement in the 
process and, consequently, the cause itself (for which he decided to fight, precisely through 
self-immolation). 
The problem arising here consists in the following: what is the most proper question I should 
pose to myself in order to take an ethical stance towards the suffering of a burning man? 
Should I prevent him from dying? If I do so I am not making any good to the cause he is 
fighting for: as mentioned above, those who immolate themselves prefer to die, and they 
prefer to do so in protest (for a cause they aim to achieve through the very act of dying). If I 
want to prevent someone’s act of protest this might mean that I am instantly complying with 
his adversary. If I do not prevent someone’s act of dying in protest (or self-immolation in 
particular), do I necessarily comply with the cause he/she is fighting for? Should I merely 
observe the ‘burning man’ and let him burn himself to death? If I anyhow decide to 
intervene, should I do it immediately or should I intervene later, in the aftermath of his act, 
while allowing him to express himself in the way he intends to do so? Besides, what should 
my intervention consist of: saving someone’s life at any cost or engaging (personally and 
collectively) in another form of life that his burning eventually opens to me and my 
community, the other kind of life (previously obscured) that his death “puts to light” anew? 
Should I only look or take a picture of the “event” (in case I were a photographer, for 
instance) in order to show it to the others and to do so publicly—which would make part of 
my intervention in compliance with the burning man’s cause? If I want to keep my “safe” 
ethical position (without intervening at all in the context of the photographed event and 
without doing anything but taking a look at the photograph produced therein), does this 
reduction of my “distant” and merely viewing position inform my ethical concern as one 
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which is neutral enough? Or could it still implicate my position of an “external” observer 
(which is a properly viewing position) into the represented act itself (and if yes, how)? 
There is another related question: what can the posthumous photograph of suffering tell me 
about my own self rather than only about the ‘burning man’ depicted therein? Bernstein says 
that ‘we have an ethical life at all not because we can reason but because we can suffer’.53 
Additionally, if our ethical life begins with an ‘emphatic identification with others’, then the 
ethics relating to images of pain is in reality a subset of the image character of the ethical: if 
he or she is doing it for me (in case I am a member of the same community persecuted by a 
political dictator and his regime, for example, especially if I am a member of community 
which does not do enough to oppose such persecution), or against me (in case I am that 
political dictator or one of his representatives), I cannot remain indifferent ‘to the recognition 
that the causing of pain by me in some fundamental manner would deny her, deny or 
suppress her intrinsic worth. Without emphatic identification with others ethical life could 
never begin’.54 So, should I intervene or not, and (in case I am supposed to intervene on the 
basis of a single photographic record) under which conditions should I look at it or ignore it? 
In their own response to this dilemma, Grønstad and Gustafsson argue that ‘in a time when 
some institutionalized discourses of power and the rhetoric of the mass media sanitize the 
reality of suffering, perhaps we need a new critical conceptology that is able to resist the 
euphemisms so endemic to the vocabulary of political hegemonies’.55 In the context of the 
present paper the question remains: what does this new critical conceptology consist of 
exactly? Following the need ‘to resist the vocabulary of political hegemonies’ as 
necropolitical hegemonies (in their self-proclaimed right to decide who must be killed or left 
alive), I treat self-immolation as an act of protest that has a profoundly counter-hegemonic 
character: the strength to oppose the political hegemonies of sovereign necropowers by 
proposing a different visual vocabulary of power. Its properties lie within the visual evidence 
of a dying body—a human being as a ‘living dead’, no more alive but still not completely 
dead—whereas the expression of such evidence is fundamentally counter-visual. The 
counter-visuality of self-immolation thus resides in the victim’s position against the ruling 
authority while suffering, while dying (i.e., in his or her intention to look the sovereign 
necropower in its face, while protesting against it through his or her own ‘fiery death’, but 
also in the intention to be seen by the others who should themselves get mobilised, in any 
other possible way, for the same cause). More precisely, the counter-hegemonic vocabulary 
of thanatopolitical power here denotes a process through which the self-immolating 
protesters inscribe themselves into the ‘constitutive assemblages of countervisuality’, as 
pointed out by Mirzoeff: 
 The right to look claims autonomy from this authority, refuses to be segregated, and 
 spontaneously invents new forms. It is not a right for declarations of human rights, or 
 for advocacy, but a claim of the right to the real as the key to a democratic politics. 
 That politics is not messianic or to come, but has a persistent genealogy […] from the 
 opposition to slavery of all kinds to anticolonial, anti-imperial, and anti-fascist politics. 
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 Claiming the right to look has come to mean moving past such spontaneous 
 oppositional undoing toward an autonomy based on one of its first principles: ‘the right 
 to existence’. The constitutive assemblages of countervisuality that emerged from the 
 confrontation with visuality sought to match and overcome its complex operations.
56
 
The counter-hegemonic and counter-visual rationality of self-immolation is, in my view, one 
of the possible ways to explain how the emotion of guilt can be induced among the direct 
observers (i.e., the ‘observant community’, in Bradatan’s terms) whom the act itself is 
supposed to address. This is related to the subversive potential of self-immolation. Hence, 
my definition of self-immolation complies with earlier exposed arguments insofar as it 
contributes to our understanding of it as a gesture of a particular kind: radically and 
unconditionally opposed towards authority and capable of inventing new forms of power 
through what I shall call the positive insults of counter-visual vocabulary. As ‘Palden 
Gyatso, a Tibetan monk who spent more than 30 years in Chinese prisons and labour camps 
once said: ‘For those who use brute force, there is nothing more insulting than a victim’s 
refusal to acknowledge their power’ (my emphasis).57 Hence, the power of images of 
suffering discloses self-immolation as a counter-visual strategy of resistance against the 
necropolitical hegemony par excellence. In conclusion, I will leave the question about self-
immolation open in the following way: 
 On the one hand, we should not look at such images because to do so is to become 
 complicit in the suffering they depict; on the other, we must look at them because by 
 refusing to do so we yield our ability to respond to them. […] The moral double-bind 
 seems to be resolved only to the extent that looking at these images can be regarded as 
 politically empowering, in that it—rather than encouraging any kind of political 
 emasculation—changes our reception and acts as a buffer against forgetting (my 
 emphasis).
58
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the contemporary visual environment, images of pain, suffering, and agony have become 
constitutive elements of the reality this paper intends to put into question—especially with 
regard to phenomena such as self-sacrifice, self-immolation by fire and assisted suicide 
(besides the general yet misleading context of ‘suicide’). In this paper I have discussed the 
‘moral double-bind’ associated with visual materialisation of suffering preceding death in 
the context of self-immolation by fire, namely: how its public display changes our reception 
of “death” (and of our own “surviving selves” as properly human beings) without losing its 
politically and emotionally empowering efficiency. For some theorists—and especially those 
dealing with visual cultures and technologies—what really matters is the global visualisation 
of suicide (or, to be exact—since I insist on a different terminology—of the thanatopolitical 
self-sacrifice) through ‘media mediated images’ and their ‘migration across different media, 
genres, and visual practices’.59 Therefore, I consider this research field to be in urgent need 
                                                     
56
 Nicholas Mirzoeff, The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2011), p. 4. 
57
 Bradatan, ‘The politics of Tibetan self-immolations’. 
58
 Grønstad and Gustafsson, p. xviii. 
59
 Bernstein, p. xiii. 
Stamenkovic, ‘A Man, Burning’   56 
 
for re-conceptualisation and critical exploration in the future, through what Grønstad and 
Gustafsson have named ‘the ethical phenomenology of images of agony.’ Thinking 
alongside them, I have argued that one of the most important questions to be posed in this 
line of thought concerns the subjects of looking as agents of social and political 
transformation at large. I defend it on the grounds of visualised suffering of the ‘living 
dead’, or suffering put into images, through which one has (or should have) a capacity to 
develop an empathetic relationship, regardless of the time and space in which the process of 
looking occurs. Therefore, instead of confirming or condemning the right to self-sacrifice by 
fire, I am rather standing against the obscurity of these and related social issues in order to 
oppose their further tabooization by inviting the reader to reconsider, for him- or herself (and 
without giving any immediate answer from my own side), whom those images are 
addressing, whose gaze they are inviting, who they are talking to, and why. 
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